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ABSTRACT

Why capital does not necessarily flow from capital-rich
countries to capital-poor countries as conventional international
trade theory would predict?

This paper studies this question in

a dynamic model that incorporates an asymmetric information
structure similar to the structure in Gertler-Rogoff (JME 1990).
As long as the degree of asymmetric information in the-capital
market is identical between the North and the South, then both
regions will converge to a steady state with the same capital
intensity, and the income gap between them will be eventually
el·iminated.

However, if the asymmetric information exists· only ·-•

in the South, the income discrepancy between the North and the
South will be magnified by international capital movements, and
the timing of capital market liberalization in the South needs to
be decided with extreme caution.
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1.

Introduct ion
One of the crucial questions for the present world economy

is, as has been argued by Lucas (1990), why capital does not
necessari ly flow from capital-ri ch·countr ies to 'Capital-p oor
countries in contrast to what conventio nal internatio nal trade
theory would predict.

Internatio nal capital movements .do not

seem to play a sufficien t role in narrowing the gap in factor
prices between countries in the North and those in the South.
Behind this puzzle is hidden the fact that real rates of interest
in poorer countries are not necessari ly higher than those in
richer countries .

Instead, as McKinnon (1991) shows, real rates

of interest are positively correlated with real rates of growth.
The economics of asymmetri c informatio n may provide a clue
to explain these phenomena .

An insightfu l article by Gertler and

Rogoff (1990) applies the economics of imperfect informatio n to
the issue of North-Sou th lending in the presence of the threat of
capital flight.

Entrepren eurs have access to risky projects as

well as safe lending abroad.

The ex-post outcome of domestic

risky projects is verifiable by a lender, but the entrepren eur's
allocatio n of funds between a domestic risky project and lending
abroad is not verifiable .

Gertler-R ogoff's two~perio d analysis

of the consequen ce of the moral hazard problem associate d with
this informatio n structure derives many illuminati ng results.
For example, capital does not necessari ly flow from the capital
rich North to the capital-po or South, but may move in the reverse

direction.

They also find that the empirical relationship

between the relative indebtedness and per capita income is con
gruent to the prediction of their theoretical model.

On reading

their article,·. the reader would naturally .be curious about the
dynamic implications:

Does the dynamic process of North-South

lending not lead to further impoverishment of the South?

May a

rise in wealth in a rich country in fact work to suppress invest
ment in a poor country?

What is the appropriate timing for a

developing country to liberalize its international capital flows?
The purpose ·of this paper is to study these questions in a
dynamic overlapping generation model that incorporates the essen
tial features of information structure analyzed in the Gertler
Rogoff model.

In particular, we derive the following results:

As long as the degree of incompleteness in the capital market due
to asymmetric information is identical between the North and the
South, then both regions will converge to a steady state with the
same capital intensity, and the income gap between them will be
eventually eliminated.

However, if the asymmetric information

exists only in the South, the income discrepancy between the
North and the South will be magnified by international capital
movements, and the timing of capital market liberalization in the
South needs to be decided with extreme caution because the·pre-··
mature liberalization would lead the South into ·a trap of under
development economic stagnation.
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The model we will develop below is an overlappin g genera
tions model with informatio n structure identical to Gertler and
Rogoff (1990).

People live for two periods, and consume only in

the second period.

A fraction of them are entrepren eurs who

receive no endowment but have access to an investmen t project.
The other fraction are lenders who supply labor in the first
period and lend their labor income to other agents.
In order to analyz.e intergene rational transfers of wealth
following Bernanke and Gertler (1989) or Sakuragaw a (1991), we
introduce two sectors of production :
sector and the investmen t-good sector.

the consumpti on-goods
In the consumpti on-goods

sector, productio n.takes place instantane ously by employing labor
and capital good with neoclassi cal production technolog y under
certainty .

In the investmen t-good sector transform ation of the

consumpti on goods into capital good takes one period of gestation
and involves the same kind of uncertain ty that was analyzed by
Gertler and Rogoff.

We also assume the existence of external

ities due to social overhead capital following the procedure
frequentl y used in endogenou s growth literature (e.g. Romer,
1986).

Labor income of lenders in the first period is earned by

working with capital stock accumulate d by the old generatio n.
This serves as the .key linkage between the economic activitie s of
successiv e generatio ns and that enables-to -study the dynamic pro
cess of economic developme nt.
The following messages arise from our framework .

First, the

differenc e in the informatio n structure in the credit market has
important as well as long-endu ring effects on the economic func-
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tion .of· internatio nal capital movements .

The·· differenc e in the

.initial condition s of income or wealth brings forth a serious
consequen ce, particula rly when the difference in the informatio n
structure exists between the North and the South.

Many develop~

ing countries seem to lack the infrastruc ture of informatio n···•
networks, appropria te accounting and legal systems that facili
tates effective monitorin g.

Thus we may presume that monitorin g·

cost in these countries are much larger than those in developed
countries .

Such a difference in informatio n structure can be a

crucial factor that explains the reverse flow of capital from the
South to the North.

The differenc e in informatio nal infra

structure seriously influence s the long-run developme nt path.
"Converge nce" could be the norm of a world economy that consists
of national economies with different initial levels of wealth but
with similar informatio n structure in the credit market; "diverg
ence of economic growth rates" (Lucas, 1988) would be a norm of
the world economy consisting of national economies with different
degree of imperfect informatio n.
Integratio n of capital market between the North wherever 
ification costs are negligible and the South where informatio n
structure is imperfect will trigger capital movements from the
South to the North.

Internatio nal capital mobility allows the

North to choose a higher investmen t level, but induces the South
to choose a lower level.

"Capital flight" gives rise to a wider

wage gap between the countries .

In the North the wage rate

becomes higher; in the south it becomes lower than it would be in
autarky.

This can be interprete d as an example of the result
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noted by Hart (1975) that the introduction -of an additional mar
ket may hurt economic welfare in the presence of incomplete
information.
Moreover, the long-run state could depend on the initial
wealth· level of the South.

The·· effects of the difference -- in the

information structure will be aggravated if there is a large _gap.
in wealth.level s.

If the gap in initial ,wealth between the North

and South at the moment of integration is sufficiently large, the
strong demand for loans from the North will absorb all of the
savings of the South, and eventually leads to the economic
collapse of the South.

Thus, our analysis implies that capital

market liberalizatio n at an early stage of development under
imperfect information may be harmful for low-income countries and
that the timing of liberalizatio n should be chosen with extreme
··caution.

This more or less supports the discussion ofthe appro

priate order of economic liberalizatio n by McKinnon (1991).
· Finally, in the world with imperfect capital market, we may··
talk about the endogenous financial repression in addition to the
regulatory financial repression extensively studied by McKinnon
(1973, 1991).

Our analysis of the closed economy suggests that

the real rate of interest is reduced under asymmetric information
even without any government regulation on the ceilings of inter-"
est rates.

Entrepreneur s are discouraged from pursuing produc

tive projects because the burden·· of incomplete credit market
falls upon them.

This may be one of the reasons we observe the

stylized fact that the real rate of interest is positively cor
related to the real rate of economic growth.
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In -section 2, we present the structure-of our--dynamic model.
·In Section 3 we derive the property of the optimal debt contract
of a small open economy to which the (risk-free) rate of interest
is exogenously given from abroad.

In Section 4, we consider a

closed economy in which the interest rate is endogenously
determined.

In the closed economy under asymmetric information,

the interest rate is_reduced, --but the .investment level chosen by_;
entrepreneurs is the same as under symmetric information.

Only-

lenders incur the agency cost.
In Section 5, we start the analysis of a dynamic two-country
model of capital movements.

If both the North and the South

suffer the· same degree of hazard due to asymmetric information, -~
but the South has a poorer initial endowment of capital, and
hence of income, at the initial moment, the income levels of the
North and-the South will converge to the same steady-state.

In

contrast to this convergence property, striking results emerge,
as indicated above, in the model studied in Section 6, where only
the South is assumed to have an incomplete capital market while
no capital-flight problem exists in the North.

Capital moves

from the South to the North, the wage gap widens rather than nar
rows after the integration of capital markets, and the country
that opens its capital market too prematurely may ·be trapped .into
underdevelopment.

2.

A Dynamic Model with Capital Flight

Let us construct an overlapping generations version of the
Gertler-Rogoff model of a small open economy.
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The information

·structure· and the notations are similar to ·those ··in· theirs.

In

this section, we start with a single-country version by explain
ing several
period t

modifications we have added to their model.

= o,

At each

1, ... , oo, a continuum of agents are born who live

for two periods.

Agents are either lenders or entrepreneurs, a

(0 <a< 1) being the fraction of .entrepreneurs and 1-a that of
lenders.
In order to build a coherent intergenerational model, we now
introduce two sectors in production:
and an investment-good sector.

a consumption-good sector

The consumption-good sector in

stantaneously produces the consumption good by combining capital
with labor under a standard· neoclassical production technology~·"
The investment-good sector transforms the consumption good into
capital by a risky investment project which is endowed to each
entrepreneur.
It is assumed that the consumption good cannot be directly
used as an·input for the production of the consumption good.

The

, consumption ...good should be transformed into capital by the
investment-good sector.

Capital is an intermediate good for the

production of the consumption good and cannot be consumed direct
ly.

Thus, the consumption-good sector is a final good sector and

the:investment-good sector.an intermediate good·sector. ·Produc
tion in the consumption-good sector takes place instantaneously.
Production in the investment-good ·sector takes one period ··of
gestation.

Capital depreciates fully after one period and the

consumption good perishes between the periods.
the timing of production.)
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(See Figure 1 for

·At any period· the consumption good is ·produced- in the
consumption- good sector under the neoclassical production tech
nology with constant returns to scale that employs two factors,
capital and labor.

Because the production technology is homogen

eous in degree one, output of the consumption good can be··
described in terms of the action of a single, aggregate, price
taking firm.

Denoting per capita (more rigorously, per

efficiency unit labor) capital at period t

as an input to the

production of the consumption good by kt, and per capita social
overhead capital that enhances the general productivity level by·
kt, we write the production function as 1
(1)
The consumption- good producer rents capital and hires labor in
spot markets.

Due to the assumption of constant returns to scale

with respect to private inputs, factor payments exhaust output
when each factor is paid its private marginal product.

Equating

the social per capita capital and the private per capita capital
such that kt= kt, we obtain the wage rate as l J.-p J Kt ana -cne
I

-

/'l, ._

..

• •

rental price of capital as~Each entrepreneur is endowed with no consumption good in
either period of her life.

In the first period of her life, she

has access to only one investment project which yields a·random

1 our

specificatio n of the production function follows
Bencivenga and Smith {1991).
Although we do not derive endogenous growth, the specificatio n
has two advantages:
(i) it simplifies calculation and facilitates
the global analysis of the nonlinear dynamics, and more importantly
(ii) it leads to the possibility of interesting multiple equilibria
in the last section.
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return in the second period.

Each investment project yields 0

units of the capital good with probability n(xt+i> and zero
otherwise between periods if xt+l units of the consumption good
are invested as an input. 2

n(·) is increasing, strictly con

cave, and continuously differentiable, such that n{O) =

= 1, and n'{O) < oo.

o,

n(oo)·

The returns to investment projects are inde

pendently and identically distributed across entrepreneurs.
Alternatively, each entrepreneur has access to another investment
opportunity with a rate of return r.

In an open economy setting

r is interpreted as the risk-free interest rate earned from
investing in foreign countries.

Entrepreneurs consume only in

·the second period of life and hence maximize their expected
second period consumption Et(ct+i>, where ct+l is the consumption
at period t+l and Et denotes the expectation operator conditional
on information available at period t.
Each lender supplies a fixed amount of labor, 1/(1-a) units
of labor, to the ·consumption sector and receive ·(1-/j)-kt· units of-~
the consumption good as the wage rate in the first period of his
life. 3

Lenders also consume only in the second period of life

and hence save the whole earning either by lending to entre
preneurs or by investing in the safe asset as in entrepreneurs.
Lenders maximize the expected second.period consumption of

2 For

example, installation of the computer system improves the
accuracy of calculations required for production, which leads to an
increase in the success probability of the project.
Recently,
Atkeson {1991) and Innes (1991) take a similar approach.
3

This is only for notational simplicity.
Qualitatively
nothing is changed if you assume that each lender supplies one unit
of labor.
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Et(ct+i>··

Both types of agents are protected by the limited

liability constraint such that ct;;::

o.

The information structure is essentially the same as that
assumed by Gertler-Rogoff.

Each entrepreneurs has access.to two

kinds of investment opportunities:
safe asset.

the risky .project and the .

The ex-post outcome of the risky project is verifi

able, but the profit from the safe asset is not verifiable to
lenders.

Lenders are able to observe the amount of loans of the-·

borrower, but cannot observe the borrower's allocation of funds
between the two investment opportunities.

The allocation of

· funds is·strictlywithin her private information, which creates a
moral hazard problem.
Presumably, the underlying assumption in Gertler and Rogoff
is that investment in financial assets is more difficult to ver
ify than investment in production.

If loans are invested in

production, there will be physical counterparts that tell the
outcome of projects, such as machines, plants, or raw ·materials ..,,
On the other hand, if they are invested in financial assets
abroad, it will be relatively easy to hide the balance abroad as
well as the profit from it.

3.

The Optimal contract
When an entrepreneur invests, she must raise loans from

lenders.
(2)

Thus, the amount of loans bt must satisfy
bt ;;::

Xt +1 ,

where bt is the amount of loans supplied to an entrepreneur born
at t.

The entrepreneur issues a state-contingent contract which·
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·pays Zt in the event when the project yields ,8, and-- Qt in the
.event when the project yields nothing.

The contract must be

structured to be specified only contingent on the verifiable pro
ject outcome.

The individual rationality condition requires that

the contract must compensate the.lenders for the risk-free inter
est rater per unit, such that
(3)

(Individual Rationality IR)
The entrepreneur's expected second-period consumption is
77(Xt+l) [0{3 - Zt] - [1 - 77(Xt+l) ]Qt + r(bt - Xt+l) .

(4)

· where ·the ;.first ·two terms represent the expected net return from
the project and thethird term the return from the safe asset.
Since the borrower's choice of the level xt+l is not verifiable,
contracts must be structured so as to induce borrowers to reveal
The incentive compatibility

the choice of xt+l truthfully.
implies
Xt+l

(5)

=

argmax (4) •

(Incentive Compatibility IC)
Since that [0{3 -

(Zt - Qt)]>

o, which we prove below, the

second-order condition for internal maximum with respect to xt+l
77 11 (Xt+1> [0{3 - (Zt - Qt)] < 0
is always satisfied.

I

Thus the incentive compatibility condition;

(5) is replaced by the first-order condition:
(6)

77' (Xt+l) [0{3 - (Zt - Qt)] = r .

Since the payment in the bad state Qt cannot exceed his second
period verifiable income, zero,
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(7)

The problem of the entrepreneur and the lenders
max

(4)

Xt+lr bt, Zt, Qt

subject to

(2)

(3)

(6) and (7).

The optimal contract is represented by two

equations:

(8)

(IR)

(9)

(IC)

and
(10)
where (8) implies the individual rationality condition for lend
ers and (9) a restatement of the incentive compatibility
condition.

(For the proof see Appendix of Gertler and Rogoff.)

Finally, we check the second-order condition.

From (8),

(9)

and (10), it follows that

for any xt+l >

o.

If information is perfect, the individual entrepreneur will
choose the investment level xt+l that satisfies the first best
condition
(11)
Equations (8) and (10) imply that the payment in the good state
is to be strictly greater than that in the bad state, such that

Zt >Qt=

o.

The comparison between (9) and (11) tells that, the
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investment level in the information-constrained ec·onomy is
strictly below the first-best level.
Now consider briefly an equilibrium in a small open economy.
The relationship between the per capita aggregate capital kt
at period t and the borrower's investment level xt determined in•·
period t-1 is given by
(12)

Three equations (8), (9) and (12) define, given the level of xt,·
a temporary equilibrium in terms of kt, Zt and xt+l in the small
open economy under asymmetric information.

The economy becomes a

capital importer at time t if the demand for investment axt
exceeds the supply of funds that is equal to (1-~)kt.
The stationary equilibrium of this economy is characterized
by the two equations without time subscripts:

z

(13)

=

rx

7r(X)

,

and

z

(14)

r

= ()~ 1T'

(x)

both of which are the restatement of (8) and (9).
Let us introduce the following assumption as made by Gertler
and Rogoff in order to assume the internal equilibrium.

Assumption 1
(15)

() ~1T' (

o) - r > o •

Figure 2 draws both IR and IC relationship on (x, Z) space.
Equation (13) is drawn as the upward-sloping IR curve through the

13

origin, and equation (14) as the downward-sloping---rc curve.

The

IC curve intersects the horizontal axis at the first-best level
xFB that satisfies (11) at the stationary state.

Given Assump

tion 1, z is strictly positive, and the investment level in the
information-constrained economy is strictly less than the-first
best xFB.

As is seen from (12), per capita aggregate capital and

thus the wage rate in the information constrained economy are
lower than their first best level that are respectively xFB and

(1-{j)kFB.

4.

A closed Economy with unverifiable Investment outcomes
Let us consider a closed economy version of the model, in

which the interest rate is endogenously determined.

Let rt

denote the interest rate prevailing between period t and period
t+l.

Now each lender saves the first-period earning only by

lending to others.

Each entrepreneur has access to only one

-investment project, and in addition she can possibly lend the
borrowed funds from lenders to other entrepreneurs or even to
other lenders.

Each lender can verify the profits of investment

projects directly funded by him, but cannot verify the profits of
investment projects indirectly funded.
The IC condition and the IR condition of this economy are
respectively replaced by
(16)

1T 1

(Xt+l) (0{3 - Zt) = rt ,

and
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(17)

The market clearing condition in the loan market is given by
(18)

where the L.H.S is the-aggregate quantity of loan demand·and the
R.H.S the aggregate quantity of loan supply.

The risk-free

interest rate is determined to satisfy (18).

Strictly speaking,

there is· no· security which guarantees rt as a one-period· (gross) · ·
interest with certainty.

rt is merely the "calculated" price

which each lender must be compensated per unit of lending.

If a

financial intermediary is formed as an institution, it will pro
vide rz per unit of.lending to lenders with certainty and rz will
be naturally interpreted as the "deposit rate of interest."

How

ever, intermediation is redundant in the sense that it does not
improve the welfare of any agent in the national economy.
Incorporating (12) into (18) gives
(19)

which describes the full dynamics of this economy.
Let us introduce another assumption that ensures the intern
al stationary equilibrium.

Assumption 2
(1-/3)

01T'

(0) > 1 •

If we denote the variables of the closed .economy,by subscript
"A", we obtain at the stationary state
(16S)

and
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(17S)
(19S)

By Assumption (2), (19S) has a unique interior stationary
equilibrium.
As Figure 3 illustrates, given Assumption 2, there exists an
interior solution.

Given x 0 >

o, there exist a unique dynamic

path converging monotonically to xA.
determined according to (10).

The sequence of kt ··is

Other two variables rt and Zt

evolve, respectively in terms of xt, as
(20)

and
(21)

where both variables are positive and decreasing in terms of

on the other hand, the symmetric information case is
described by three equations (10), (18), and
(22)

Comparing the two economies between in presence of and absence of
asymmetric information, · you will easily ·find ·that, the -stationary
state value of x (and hence k) as well as the dynamics of xt (and
hence kt) are the same so·long as the initial conditions are the
same.
The difference in the information structure between the two
economies is reflected in the interest rate.
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Denoting the values

on the comparison of information with superscript

"*u

and those

under asymmetric information without it, we obtain the following
result on the comparison of stationary states.

We denote vari

ables at the stationary state by those with subscript

"A" ..

Proposition 1
The interest rate in the·information-constrained case is·
lower than the interest rate under complete information, such··
that r; > rA.

Intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows:

If the same

interest rt would be quoted between the closed and the open
economy, the investment level must be smaller in the information
constrained economy, as is easily seen by comparing (9) and (11)
with Zt >

o.

However, the aggregate savings are predetermined

when the investment level is chosen in the constructual arrange
ment.

Hence, the investment levels must be the same between the ·

two economies.

It follows that market clearing mechanism in the

loan market makes the rate of interest is lower in the
information-constrained economy.
The agency cost is entirely incurred by lenders in such a
manner thatthe--interest rate earned by lending is below the case
with complete information.

In the case of a closed economy,

there is no loss due·to incomplete information, and there is only
a difference in the distribution of profits between borrowers and
lenders.
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The contrast of this result to the result for--the small open
economy reveals the fact that openness or the possibility of cap
ital flight is instrumental for the emergence of aggregate agency
costs .for a national economy in this setting.

In a small open

economy, there is a national loss due to under-investmentarising
from incomplete information.

Wages at the stationary are lower

than the first-best under the complete market.

The agency costs

are shared between lenders and entrepreneurs.
The issue of "financial repression" has been extensively
discussed by McKinnon {1973, 1991) concerning many experiences in
developing countries.

Proposition 1 can be interpreted as an

alternative explanation of the phenomena of financial repression-,,
from the standpoint of incomplete information rather-than that of
government regulations on interest rates.
We may illustrate the situation by a concrete functional
form of 1r(x).

Example 1
1T

X

(x) =

x+l '

This gives a convenient example because it satisfies all the
conditions, 1r{O) = o, and 1r(x)

➔

1 as x

Assumption 2 implies
{l-{3)8>1,

and under this assumption we obtain
at the stationary state.
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➔ oo.

X

r

=

= X = x* = (1-~)8 - 1
~

( 1-/j) [ ( 1-/j)

z

s.

=

0

+ 1]

~

> 0,

~

< r* =

(1-/j) [ (1-/j)

0

( 1-~) 2 8 I

I

+ 1]

Two-country Model with Identically Incomplete
Information structure

Let us embed the dynamic structure we have just introduced
in the two-country general equilibrium model where incomplete
information prevails in both countries.

The two countries are

identical except for the levels of initial wealth.

In the begin

ning, the-North is richer than the South, which is represented by
the initial levels of capital.

Let us denote variables of the

North by those with superscript"*" and those of the South by
those without the superscript.

In the following, we discuss the

effect of integration of capital market.

In our framework, it

makes no difference whether trade of goods is permitted, because
the relative price of the capital .goods to the consumption goods
is a constant, .~, throughout time.
Suppose that the capital markets of the two countries are
integrated, so that the market clearing condition in the inte
grated capital market implies
(23)

The IC condition and the IR condition of the South are
(24a)

and
(24b)
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respectively, where .··.~ is· the world interest rate prevailing be
Similarly, we have in the North

tween period t and period t+l.
(25a)
and

*

Zt* -- Rt

(25b)

Xt+l

*

1f

where

z;

(Xt+l)

represents the payment for the good state of the project

in the North.
Capital accumulates in both countries to satisfying
(26a)
and
(2Gb)

The seven equations of (23),

(24a), {24b),

and (2Gb) define the world economy.

(25a),

(25b),

(26a)

Incorporating (24b) into

(24a), collecting terms, we obtain
(27)

Similarly, .im.;orporat.iny (25b)

into (25a), .L~a..L.La.uy..i.uy

terms, we obtain
= 0{3

R

{28)

t

1l'
1f

(x:+1) 1l (x:+1)

*
* Xt+l
* +1l' (Xt+l)
(Xt+l)

'

If investment projects are undertaken in both countries,
(27) and (28) implies
(29)

since the R.H.S of (27) and (28) are decreasing function of the
argument.
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Substituting (26a) and (26b) into (23), we rewrite the capi
tal market clearing condition by
(30)

First, let us characterize a stationary equilibrium, in
which all variables-are held constant-through time.

Two station-:

ary variables (x, x*) satisfy the 45 degree line obtained from
(29), and
( 31)
in the (x, x*) space. 4

As Figure 4I illustrates, there exists a

unique interior stationary state x
x = x*.

=

xA, and x*

=

xi, hence

Concerning the stationary state, nothing is changed com

pared with the closed economy.

At the stationary state capital __

never flows between countries.
Next let us examine dynamics.

Incorporating (29) into (30),

we derive a set of two dynamic equations:
(32a)
and
(32b)
The whole dynamics is illustrated in Figure 4II.

Suppose that

the initial condition (x 0 , x 0) is given in an interior.

At

period 1, the economy jumps to the intersection of the 45 degree
line defined by equation (29) and the straight-line which is
diagonal to the 45 degree line of attainable pair of (x 1 , xi)
that is defined by (x 0 , x 0) and equation (30) in such a way that
(33)

4see the Appendix [A] for the property of the curve of equa
tion (31).
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From point B, the economy converges to the s-tationa·ry state A on
the 45 degree line.

Even in the transition, international capi

tal movements never arise because the economy goes through the 45
degree line from period 1 on.

The interior stationary state is

dynamically stable. · Any difference ·in the initial wealth levels· ·
never affects the long-run state. 5

Propo·sition 2:

· The

initial level of wealth will not affect the

long-run equilibrium, if the degree of asymmetric information is
identical between the North and South.

6.

The case Where Only the south Suffers from
Incomplete Information

We depart from the two-country model above by assuming that
only in the South capital market is incomplete.

According to our

setting, lenders can verify any kinds of profits of entrepreneurs
in the North, while lenders can-verify only the outcome of in
vestment .projects_ .in the South.

We could support this assumption

by arguing that the level system to enforce property rights, mon
itoring technology of banks, or accounting principle are less
developed in many of the developing countries.

In contrast, in

developed countries :institutional·arran gements which enforce:ver
ification of earned profits are developed.
5

A more gradual movement of transition would be derived in a
model·where each entrepreneur works·and earns wage incomes·in the
first period of life.
Strictly speaking, we have three other stationary states in
the present model, (0, xA), (xA, 0), and (0, 0). For example, if
and only if the initial condition satisfies xt = o and x; > o,
(0, xA) is eventually realized.
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Start from the world under autarky.

one can easily find

that the resource allocations of the two countries are unchanged
from those analyzed in Section 4.

At a stationary state, the

values of x; and xt (and hence k; and kt), accordingly the wage
rates, are identical between· the North and the·· South.

As-·Propo--

sition 1 shows, the interest rate is higher in the North than in
the South.

Suppose now that the capital markets are integrated.

The optimality condition of northern entrepreneur s who be
have under complete information simply implies
(34)

Except that (34) replaces (25a) and (25b), no other conditions
are-necessar y from the.equation s of the two country models .in
Section 5.
First, let us focus attention on interior equilibria.
equations (23),

(24a),

interior equilibria.

(24b),
(24a),

(26a),

(26b)

six

and (34) define

(24b) and (34) imply

(35)
By the implicit function theorem there exists a continuously dif
ferentiable functionµ:

[O, oo)

➔
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[M, oo) such that

(36)

with three properties:
> xt for any xt >

( i)

o for any xt

µ' (·) >

o , ( ii) x;

>

o, and (iii) µ(0) = M > o. 6

Equation x; = µ(xt), which we call IA equation, decides the
investment allocation between the two countries.

Again, equation

(30), which we call CM equation, describes the dynamics of

investment that clears the world capital market.

These equations

fully describe the internal dynamic path of investment.
First, examine the stationary states.

=

µ(x)

As in Figure SI, x*

is drawn·upward sloping curve UV and situated in the

northwest region of the

45

degree line.

stationary states are

obtained at the intersections of (31) that is drawn as curve xAx:
6

First, we derive µ'(·)
differentiation of (35) yields
dµxt

=

>

for

0

any

>

o.

Total

[n'(xt)J 2 [rr'(xt)Xt

since rr" ( · ) < 0 and rr ' (xt) xt - rr (xt) <

0•

Second, we prove that µ(xt) > xt for any xt >

to the contrary that, x;

~

xt.

o.

suppose not,

From (35) and the fact that

rr(xt)
rr (xt> + xtrr' (xt>
is strictly less than unity for any xt >

which is a contradiction.
Third, we prove that µ(0) >
lim _ _ _rr_(x_t_>_ __
n (xt> + Xtrr' (xt)
Hence, (31) implies, at x =

.

o.

o, this is valid only if

Using l'Hopital's rule,

n' (xt)
2n' (xt) + xtrr' (xt>

= l i m - - - - - - - - - = 0.5 .

o,

n' ( x *) = o. Sn' ( o) < rr' ( o) •
Therefore, x* must be positive because rr' ( ·) is decreasing.
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Q.E.D.

and x*·= µ,(x).

As Figure 5II.illustrates, there may be a single

stationary state like I, or internal stationary states (I and
I').

If µ(O) is too large, there may be no interior stationary

state.
Denoting variables ·in the integrated world by those with·
subscript "I" in contrast to subscript "A" that corresponds to
the state of autarky, we derive three results concerning the sta- tionary states. · Those ·propositions hold· regardless of -,whether
stationary states may be unique or multiple.

Proposition 3
In any interior stationary states, the per-capita level of ··
investment (accordingly of capital) becomes higher than the
autarky level for the North, and lower than the autarky level for
the South.

Xr < xA =xi< xi

for any interior stationary states.

This proposition is obvious from Figure 51 or 5II.

Proposition 4
Capital flows from the South to the North.

Proof.

It is sufficient to prove (1-~)0n(xi) < x;.

the contrary that

(i)

(1-~) On (xi)

Denote

25

Suppose to

( 1 -{3 ) ()

- ·by ,,,, (x) .

1T ( X)
X

r, (x) is a decreasing function of x, and r, (xi) ~ 1.

From Proposition 3, Xr < xi, so that we obtain
(ii)

r, (xr) > r, (xi) ~ 1.

(iii)

implies that

which violates (31), which is a contradiction.

Proposition

Q.E.D.

5

The rate of interest Rat the stationary state of the inte
grated world is between the autarky interest rates.

(The autarky

interest rate of the North is higher than that of the South.)

The R.H.S of (21) is strictly decreasing in xt+i- 7

Proof.

Since one has Xr < xA from Proposition 2, one obtains rA < R by
comparing (21) and (27).
Similarly, comparing (22) and (34) and using the fact of xi
< xi that is implied by Proposition 3, one obtains R < r*. Q.E.D.

Capital moves from the South to the North.

-capital moments

take place because southern lenders would substitute their funds

7

we derive
1r"1r2 _ 1r'2 (1r-1r'x)
dr
: --------- <
dx
(7r'X + 7T) 2

since

7f -

x1r' >

o.
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Q

I

from domestic to foreign lending for a higher rate of return.
Integratio n of the two capital markets leads to an equalizat ion
southern lenders face a

of the interest rates across countries .

higher interest rate, and northern lenders a lower rate.

The

changes in interest rates reduce the investmen t level of the
South, and increase that of the North.

Thus, "capital flight"

triggers a unwelcome discrepanc y of the investmen t levels between
the two countries .
Propositio ns 3 through 5 are not due to the particula r spec
ification of informatio n structure .

So long as we assume two

countries which differ in the extent of asymmetri c informatio n,
we obtain similar results.

Alternativ ely, Sakuragaw a {1993) de-,

rives similar propositio ns by assuming two countries which differ
in the monitorin g costs under the setting of Townsend' s (1979)
costly-st ate-verif ication.

Finally, in·order to illustrate the property of the dynamics
of our model, by specifying n(·) as in Example 1 in Section 4, we
present the following Propositio n.

Propositio n 6
Suppose that n(x)

=

x/(l+x), then there is a unique interior

stationar y state if {l-~)9

>V2, and there are two interior sta

tionary states if (1-~)9 ~

V2.

The proof proceeds in two steps.
strictly convex.

First, we show that µ(x)

Second, we show that,µ
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is

(0) < xA if (1-~}9

>

V2, and

µ

(0) ~ xA if otherwise. 8

(See the Appendix [BJ for

Both cases are illustrated in Figure 6I and

the formal proof.)
6II.

Examination of corner solutions is necessary, because the
·dynamic process may eventually lead to a corner solution ,even·· if ·
the initial condition is interior.
increasing and µ{O) =V2 - 1.

From {35), µ(·) is strictly

Allowing for the possibility of

corner solutions, investment allocation (IA) condition (35) is
replaced by three different investment allocation conditions:
Case (a):

If x; >V2 - 1 and xt > O (namely, in the internal

positive quadrant)
{37a)
as drawn by curve
Case (b):

UV

in figure 6I or 6II.

If x; ~ V2 - 1 and xt = O ( on the segment OU)

{37b)
Case (c):

If

x;

> V2 - 1 or xt = o. 9

8As long as µ"' ( ·) > o, we can derive the same qualitative
result as Proposition 6 for a more general form of the probability
function.
9

applies also to the case where
However, as will be
seen below, such cases would never arise if the initial condition
is given in an interior.

x;

~

strictly speaking,

{37b)

V2 - 1 and xt > o, {37c) where x; = O.
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{37c)
In Case (a), the loan market clearing condition {23) is un
changed.

Let the inverse function of (36) be denoted by the

inverse function
{39)

The whole economy in Case (a) is composed-of the two differ
ence equations:
(40a)
and
(40b)
In Case (b), {30) reduces to {33a); in Case (c), (30) reduces to
( 3 3a) .
The whole system is illustrated in Figures 7I and 7II in the
space of (x, x*).

We consider two distinct figures according to

whether (I) {l-/3)8 > V2 - 1 (Figure 7I) or (ii) (1-/3)8 < V2 - 1 ---:
{Figure 7II).

Suppose that the initial condition is given in an

interior, such that x 0 > 0 and x; >V2 - 1.

The formal analysis

of the dynamic process is left to the Appendix [CJ.
Let us consider Figure 7I first.

Inside xAx1, capital

accumulation takes ·place in the northeast direction; outside xAx:- in the southwest direction.

Given any interior initial condition

like (x 0 , x;),-the world economy-jumps to a point like Sin the
next period, and afterwards converges to the new stationary state
I, the unique interior stationary state is globally stable.
Accordingly, in the North the wage rate increases, while in the
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Integration of the capital markets widens

South i t decreases.

-rather than narrows the wage discrepancy between the two coun
tries at the new stationary state.

The rental price of capital~

will be the same regardless of economic environments.
Suppose that the capital markets are integrated when the
world is at the stationary state under autarky (xA, x:).

In the

next period, the economy jumps to a point like T, and afterwards
converges to I that is given by-the intersection of curve xAx:
and the curve x* = µ(x).

At I, x* is higher, and xis smaller

than at A, and capital continues to flow from the South to the
North during the convergence process because the dynamic process
continues along x*

=

µ(x).

Next, consider Figure 7II.

Here the initial wealth level of

the South affects the long-run stationary equilibrium.
two internal equilibria.

There are

We call the high equilibrium H whose

coordinnate is (xH, x:), and the low equilibrium L, whose coordinate is- denoted by· (xL, x~).

Let us define a curve PQ through-~

L, which describes the locus of the initial wealth pair x 0 , x
such that
( 41a)
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0

PQ divides the (x, x*) into two regions. 10 If the initial con
dition of (xo, Xo) satisfies,
{41b)
(x0 , x 0) is located in the northwest of PQ.

Conversely, if the

initial condition satisfies,
(41c)
{x 0 , x 0) is located northeast of PQ.

If the initial pair of

wealth is located in the northeast of PQ, the economy can afford
to jump to a point on LV and eventually converges to H.

If the

initial pair of wealth is in the southwest of PQ at period 1 the
economy has ·to· jump to some point UL and eventually converges to'"
{O, x:) because UL is outside curve xAx: and, accordingly, cap
ital decumulates along x = µ(x*).
If the South is not too poor relative to the North at the
initial moment, the world converges to the state H.

on the other

hand, if the South is sufficiently poor at the initial moment,
liberalizatio n of the domestic capital market to the world capi-

PQ is downward sloping and convex to the -origin because from
{41a), implicitly we can derive
10

dx 0*
dx 0

=

1f'
1f'

(Xo)
*
(xo)

<0

I

and
d2 Xo*
dxa2

=

1r"
1f'
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(Xo)
>
*
(xo)

0 •

tal market drives the South down to the worst state-of the under
11
development trap where x = o in the long-run.

In the integrated world, if the initial wealth gap between
the North and the South is too large, the North's demand for cap
ital is sufficiently large relative to the South's demand.

This

tends to increase the world interest rate to the level at which
southern entrepreneur s find it unprofitable to invest in their
projects, which in turn, makes it advantageous for southern lend
ers to invest all of their funds abroad.

In such a case, "com

plete" capital flight would take place, which leads to a collapse
of the South, that is, •to a state with zero domestic production, .....
zero saving, and hence zero national income.

The effects of the

difference in the information structure are aggravated if there
is a substantial gap of wealth at the moment of integration.
In the closed economy, on the other hand, this threshold
property never arises.

Under autarky southern lenders are . oblig,~.

ed to lend their funds to domestic entrepreneur s who would offer
a smaller interest rate because the lenders have no any other in
vestment opportunitie s.

However, if the capital market is open

ed, southern lenders have a chance to lend to the North, which
triggers the disastrous capital flight.

This is an example of

,

the result by Hart (1975) that the introduction of another market
may harm the welfare if the market structure is incomplete.

11

A similar dynamic pattern in an information constrained
economy is seen in Sakuragawa (1992), and in a model of nonlinear
savings behavior as seen in Fukao and Hamada (1992).
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Integration of the world capital market eventually deteriorates.
the welfare of the South.
We may recall historical examples.

From the late 1970s to

the early 1980s, a sizeable amount of domestic deposits in the
Latin American countries flowed to banks - in the United -States,
impeding economic development in the Latin American countries.
Most oil money earned by the OPEC countries was invested in
developed countries, and only a fraction of it was invested in
developing countries.

These phenomena are most naturally under

stood in the framework of incomplete information.
The analysis in this section bears a significant policy
implication on the timing of capital market deregulation for
developing countries.

The government of the South may as well

take account of the possibility that liberalization will make the
domestic country worse off.

Even in the case in which liberali

zation may eventually be desirable to the South for some
reasons, 12 timing -of integration -is crucial.

Liberalization in --

the capita.l .market.in an early stage of development could pos
sibly drive the domestic country down to the underdevelopment
trap.

If the South is in developing process, too hasty liberal

ization of capital markets is not desirable to the North.

The

North can exploit the benefits· of integration by capital. imports ,,
after the economy of the South has passed a stage of "take off."

12 Even

the higher equilibrium H, wages in the South are lower
than in autarky. However, since the rate of interest in the South
is higher, there may be incentives for lenders to liberalize capi
tal market.
33

7.

Concluding Remarks
We have presented a simple dynamic model of North-South

lending with the possibility of capital flight.

In a dynamic

version of the two-country model by Gertler and Rogoff, in which
information structures of the North and the South are identical,·
the world economy converges to a harmonious steady state regard
less of the initial wealth levels of the North and the South.
This conclusion is dramatically altered when-we depart from their
0

assumption and introduce a difference in information structures
between the North and the south.

Under the integrated world cap

ital market,·capital moves from the South to the North, and the
South may be trapped into an underdevelopment trap if its initial
wealth is below a critical level.

Thus the timing of capital

liberalization becomes a crucial issue.
We have seen that the difference in information structure
exerts a serious and long lasting impact on the development process.

The creation of infrastructures including information

·,..

networks, a legal system, an accounting system, and the develop
ment of monitoring skill are thus crucially important.

The fact

that hegemons in the world economy always had well developed
capital markets may have been more than mere coincidence.
Incidentally·, a similar analysis with similar economic
implications could be conducted using the macroeconomic model
studied by Williamson (1987), and Greenwood and Williamson (1989)
based on the costly state verification approach originated by
Townsend (1979) and others.

(For that type of analysis of inter

national capital movements, see Sakuragawa 1993).
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If there is a difference in information structures, initial
,,conditions in wealth or in income do indeed matter.

The liberal

ization of international capital flows that would benefit a
developing country at later stages could push the country down to
stagnation and underdevelopment trap if effected prematurely.
Recent studies emphasize the role of human capital and ex
ternalities to explain the lack of sufficient capital flows from
the North to the South (see, for example, Lucas 1990; Barro,
Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin 1992).

In contrast, we have emphasized

the role of asymmetric information and incentive compatibility.
We do not consider the two approaches as necessarily contra
dictory because legal, accounting, and organizational structure
are important ingredients of human capital as public goods.
Our analysis is based on many simplifying assumptions, and
its policy implications should be taken with caveats.

There are

several ways to generalize the model so as to be more applicable
to practical policy, questions.··

For example, an extension of this

model by introducing commodity trade will be able to shed light
on the issue of the order of liberalization in various markets of
developing economy (McKinnon 1991, Sakuragawa 1993).

A more

realistic and gradual time path could be studied in a model where
an entrepreneur earns wage incomes in the firstperiod of her
life.

Also, the effect of taxation on international resource

allocation (e.g. Frenkel, Razin and Sadka, 1991)

will be viewed

from a new angle if one superimposes upon it the information
structure of incomplete capital market that is considered in this
paper.

We hope that the simple analysis given in this paper will
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be a preliminary step to clarify the important relationship
between incomplete information and international credit market.
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Appendix

Properties of the capital accumulation CA curve, equation

[A]
(31)

Total differentiation of (31) yields
dx*

(i)

dx

=

(1-/3)(hr'(x) -1
(1-/3) (hr' (x*) - 1 '

where we assume
(ii)

(1-/3) (hr' (x*) #- 1 .

First, consider the region of x

[O, xAJ•

€

two x*'s which satisfy (31), o and x;.
ution, x*

=

o, we derive, at x

=

At x = o, there are

Ignoring the trivial sol

o,

dx* > 0

(iii)

dx
since (1-{3)8n'(O) > 1 and (1-{3)8n(xi) < 1 are satisfied.
x

€

At any

(0, XA), it follows that
(1-/3) On(x) - x

(iv)
from (31).
x e (O, xA).

=

x* - (1-/3) On(x*) > o

Hence, (1-{3)8n(x*) < 1 is always satisfied over
Of course, Assumption (ii) is satisfied.

Obviously, there exists a unique x+, such that o < x+ < xA,
satisfying
(v)

(1-/3) On' (x+)

=

1 .

We can distinguish between three.cases, (a) dx*/dx > O for
o < x < x+,

(b) d~*/dx =oat x = x+, and (c) dx*/dx < o for x+

< x < xA, since n(·) is increasing and strictly concave.

Differentiation of the L.H.S. of (i) with respect to x gives
since n(·) is strictly concave.
concave over x

€

The curve (31) is strictly

{O, xA).
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(vi)

(1-/3) (hr" (x)
< 0 ,
(1-/3) On' (x*) - 1

=

Second, consider the region of x*

[O, x:J.

€

From the sym

metric property of x and x* in (31), qualitatively the same
analysis will follow.
Finally, we check, at x = xA,
dx*

(vii)

dx

since x

(BJ

=

= -l '

x*.

The proof of Proposition 6.
(35) becomes
1

(i)

1

=

Total differentiation yields
=

and
d 2 Xt*

1
=--->O.

dx~
From ( i) , at xt

= o, x~ = V2 =

x~ + 1
From ( i) , µ ( o)

1.

from Example 1 in Section 4, x:
is unique if µ(O) < x:, that is,

= (1-(3)0 - 1.
V2

tions are two if µ(O) > x:, that is,

(CJ

= V2 - 1, and

The intersection

< (1-(3)0, and the intersec

V2

> (1-(3)0.

Q.E.D.

The dynamics of xt and x~
First, examine the dynamics of xt.

we can define m(xt+i> by
38

From the above analysis,

m(Xt+1> = Xt+l + µ (Xt+1> if (a) x;+l > V2 - 1 and Xt+l >

0

•

.It is easy to see
m'(·) = 1 + µ'(·) > 1 ,
m11

= µ 11

( • )

( • )

= µ (0) =

m(O)

> o , and

V2 -

1

•

Next, define n(xt) by
n(xt) = (1-~)0[n(xt) + n(µ(xt))J if (a) x~ >V2 - 1 and xt >

o.

Again it is easy to see
n'(·) = (1-~)0[n'+ n'µ'] > O,
n 11

( • )

= (1-~) 0 [ n 11 + n 11 { µ' } 2 + n 'µ 11 ] < o , and
n(O)

=

(1-~)

0 (V2 - 1) /V2

.

We have two cases according to whether (I) (1-~) 0 > V2 - 1
(Figure SI) or (II) (1-~)0 < V2 - 1 (Figure 8II).
if x 0 (>

O)

In case (I),

is below (above) the stationary state Xr, xt in

creases (decreases).

In case (II), the system bifurcates at xL.

If xt is below xL or above xH, xt decreases, while if xt is below
xH and above xL, xt increases.
Next examine the dynamics of x;. Define m*(xt+i> by
m* (x;+l) = x;+l + µ-l (x;+l) if (a) x;+l > V2 - 1 and Xt+l >

0

,

= x;+l if (b) x; :::; V2 - 1 and xt = o ,
or (c) x*t > V2 - 1 and xt =

O •

It is easy to see
m*'(·) = 1 + µ- 11

(·)

m* 11

(·)

> 1 if (a), and= 1 if (b) or (c),

=

µ- 111

(·)

> o if (a),

m* (V2 - 1) = V2 - 1 .
Alternatively, define n*(xt) by
n*(xt) = (1-~)0[n(xt) + n(µ- 1 (xt))J
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if (a) x~ > V2 - 1 and xt > o ,

=

(1-P)On(xt) if (b) x~ ~ V2 - 1 and xt

=

O,

or (c) x~ > V2 - 1 and xt = o
It is easy to see
n*'(·) = (1-P)O[n'+ n'µ- 1 '] > o if (a),

= (1-P)On' > o if (b) or (c).
n*"(·) = (1-P)O [n" + n"{µ,- 1 } 2 + n'µ"- 1 ) < o if (a),

= (1-P)On" < o if (b) or (c),
n* CV2

-

1) = c1-P>

oCV2 -

1) /V2

.

For the case of (a) and (b), we have two cases according to
whether (I)
9II).

c1~p) 0 '> V2 (Figure 9I) or (II) (1-P) 0 < V2 (Figure

In case (I),·if x~ is below (above) x*, x~ is increasing

(decreasing).

In case (II) if x~ is below x: or above x~ and

below x;, x; is increasing, while if x; is above xi and x~ or
above x~, x~ is decreasing.
On the other hand, for the case of (b) and (c), the whole
dynamics is the same as in Figure 3.

40

References

Atkeson, a., 1991, International lending with moral hazard and
risk of repudiation, Econometrica 59, 1069-89.
Barro, R. J., N. G. Mankiw, and x. Sala-i-Martin, 1992,.,Capital
mobility in neoclassical models of of growth, Economic
Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 655, Yale University.
Bencivenga, v. R., and B. Smith, 1991, Financial intermediation
and endogenous growth, Review of Economic Studies 58,
195-209.
Bernanke, B., and M. Gertler, 1989, Agency cost, net worth, and
business fluctuations, American Economic Review 79, 14-31.
Frenkel, J. A., A. Razin, and E. Sadka, 1991, International
Taxation in an Integrated World, MIT Press.
Fukao, K., and K. 'Hamada, 1992. The Fisherian time preference
and the evolution of capital ownership patterns in a global
economy, EGC Discussion Paper, Yale University.
Gertler, M., and K. Rogoff, 1990, North-South lending and endoge
nous domestic capital market inefficiencies, Journal of
Monetary Economics 26, 245-266.
Hart,

o. D., 1975. On the Optimality of Equilibrium When Markets
Are Incomplete, Journal of Economic Theory. 11, 418-443.

Innes, R. D., 1991, Investment and government intervention in
credit markets when there is asymmetric information, Journal
of Public Economics 46, 347-82.
Levine, R., 1991, Stock markets, growth, and tax policy, Journal
of Finance, 1445-65.
Lucas, L. E., 1990, Why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor
countries?, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings
92-6.
Lucas, R. E., Jr., 1988, On the mechanics of economic
development, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22, 3-32.
McKinnon, R. I., 1973, Money and Capital in Economic Development,
Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution.
, 1991,
- - -Control
Press.

The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial
in the Transition to a Market Economy, Johns Hopkins

41

Romer, P., 1986, Increasing returns and long-run g~owth, Journal
of Political Economy 94, 1002-37.
Townsend, R., 1979, Optimal contracts and competitive markets
with costly state verification, Journal of Economic Theory,
21, 265-293.
Sakuragawa, M. 1992, Net worth, credit rationing, and economic
development, mimeo, Nagoya City University.

42

C sector
(consumption
good sector)

I Yt •

I
I
I

t~k!-P

I
I

~

labor I

FIGURE 1

I
I
l

wage I (1- P)ki

1-«: lenden

savin1g1I

(born att)

r

I

contract!
signed bt

(born at t)
I

~+1

l!~r
(Invi:stment
good sector)

a

capital

•

pa - Zi

0

with prob.

0

.l

1t{~+1)

with prob. 1-1t(~+1)

(return) (consumption)

I
I

I
I

I
I

capital
(rental)

y

rental fee

pa

capital flight
(possibility)
total overhead capital
ki+1 = «a1t(~+1>

I Yt+1

C sector

·labor

p -1-p
= kt+1~+1

(1-P)ki+i

lenden
(born at t+1)
Period t

Period t+1

tt(~.1)

O with prob. 1-1t(~.1)

I

investment
«: entreprene un _ _
_ _ __
+'

•

I

l

L,J

.
consumptio
n { Zi with prob.

payment received

saving

FIGUR E2

z
8P-r
x(O)

X

FIGURE3

0

ro

X

44

FIGURE 4I

X

FIGURE411

x•

/
-x + (1-P)8[x(Xo) + x(:xo)]

45

FIGURE SI
V

FIGURES II
V

/ x • • µ(x)

46

FIGURE 61

(i) (1-P)8 >

/f

FIGURE 611

(ii) (1- p)8 <

/f
V

x*

r'- µ(x) /

U(O,

/f -1)

~==1r

I'-+-''--- ----+---- ~

X

47

FIGUR E 71

(I) (1-P)6 >

.ff

+ (l-P}o[1t(Xo) + 1t{x0)]
in terms of (x, x*)

X

FIGUR E 711 (II) (1-P )8 <

.ff
V

XLl-- -~V

/2-l i--,: s;~~ ,--- ~--~
7\;:-- ----.i .~~- 0
xL + xL =
ar1t<Xo> + 1t{xa>1

c1-

t'--- --'-- ---. ..J- ---- --~A

48

in terms of (Xo,

xt,)

FIGURE 81 (i) (1-P)8 > ,/f

(1-P)8,/f -l

,ff

,/2-1
0

FIGURE 811

X

(ii) (1- p)8 < ,/f

I
,ff -1
(1-P)8,/f ~l

fi . . ___.,_ _________.________
0.

XL

49

FIGURE 91

(i) (1-P)8 > ./2

(1-P)0 ~ 1 _ _ __

./2 - l 1------,...... .....+----l'

oc:.. .-..L ------ L--~ -----J .----- -./2 -1

FIGURE 911 (ii) (1- p)8 <

x;._

xj

x*

./f

./2-1......__ _ _ _ ___
(1- P)8 Jf - 11 - - - - - + - - - - - - - , (

J2XAl---- -+------ -,r--

0

xl • (1-P)8-1

f

t

xi_

(1-p)av'f -l Jf-l
{i
50

x*

